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SMITH V. COLE: TRIUMPH IN FAMILY COURT
IN SMITH v. COLE,' the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that
a biological father had a duty to support his child, even though
the child's mother was married to another man and the law recog-
nized that he was the child's legal father. While in direct conflict
with the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Michael H. v. Gerald D.," Smith was nevertheless the
better decision for all parties involved.
The facts of the case were unusual. The plaintiff, Ledora Mc-
Cathen Smith, had been married to Henry Smith for four years
and had raised two children. During the fall of 1974, the Smiths
separated and Ledora began living with the defendant, Playville
Cole, despite remaining legally married to Henry.' One year later
Donel Patrice was born. Although Playville acknowledged that he
was the biological father, the birth certificate named Henry as the
father.4 Henry never attempted to legally disavow his paternity.
Accordingly, in 1976, when Playville and Ledora attempted 'to
change Donel's surname to Cole, Henry refused to cooperate.5
In 1978, the Smiths divorced. The divorce decree mentioned
the previous two children but failed to mention Donel.6 Ledora
and Playville ended their five-year relationship in 1980. Ledora
then brought a filiation action against Playville in 1988 to prove
paternity and to obtain child support.7 Playville raised an excep-
tion to Ledora's action. First, he argued that he was not the pre-
sumed (legal) father because the Smiths were still married when
Donel was born and because Henry had never disavowed his pa-
ternity, as was required under the state statute at the time.8 Sec-
ond, he claimed that since a legitimate father already existed,
1. 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989).
2. 109 S. Ct. 2333, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 22 (1989).
3. Smith, 553 So. 2d at 848.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. A filiation action is a judicial proceeding to determine the paternity of an illegiti-
mate child. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (5th ed. 1979).
8. See Smith, 553 So. 2d at 849 (citing LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 184 (West Supp.
1990)).
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Ledora could not be allowed to "bastardize" her child simply to
obtain money.'
The trial court sustained Playville's exception.' 0 The court of
appeal reversed this decision, holding that Ledora had a proper
cause of action under the principle of dual paternity." Playville
then appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The State Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court, holding
that dual paternity did exist in Louisiana and obligating Playville
to pay child support. 2
This Comment discusses the Supreme Court of Louisiana's
decision in light of the Supreme Court of the United States' deci-
sion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,13 which held that under Califor-
nia law, a biological father had no right to maintain a relationship
with his daughter when a legal father already existed. A legal fa-
ther was defined as any man who was married to the mother at
the time the child was born, whether or not he was the biological
father. Utilizing this interpretation, the Court denied the biologi-
cal father visitation rights to his daughter. After analyzing the
Smith decision, this Comment will explain why the Supreme
Court of the United States erred by not granting Michael his visi-
tation rights.
I. HISTORY
The subjects of paternity and illegitimate children are gov-
erned by statute. Louisiana originally enacted statutes which
treated illegitimate children quite harshly. 4 For example, a for-
mer Louisiana statute allowed fathers to provide for illegitimate
children in their wills only if the father was not survived by de-
9. Id. at 849.
10. Id.
11. Under this principle, a person can establish his parentage (i.e., a biological par-
ent) despite the existence of a legally recognized parent. Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d
813, 815 (La. 1974); see infra note 31.
12. Smith, 553 So. 2d 847, 855.
13. 109 S. Ct. 2333, reh'g denied, l10 S. Ct. 22 (1989). This case had no majority
opinion with Justice Scalia delivering the Court's plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
joining, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joining except for footnote 6. Id. at 2336.
Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion with which Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at
2346. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only. Id. at 2347. Justice Brennan filed a
dissenting opinion with Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun joining. Id. at 2349. Justice
White also wrote a dissenting opinion with Justice Brennan joining in the opinion. Id. at
2360. This Note solely discusses the Court's plurality opinion written by Justice Scalia.
14. E.g., Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 849 (La. 1989).
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scendants, ascendants, collateral relations or a wife, and they had
acknowledged the illegitimate children. 5 Interestingly, children
conceived from an adulterous affair between the mother and a
man not her husband were recognized by law as the legitimate
children of the mother's husband. 6 With this historical back-
ground, the Louisiana legislature enacted article 184, which pro-
vided that "the law considers the husband of the mother as the
father of all children conceived during marriage. '17
Consistent with these developments was the Supreme Court
of the United States' decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D.18 In
Michael H., the Court was confronted with the application of a
California statute that read: "the issue of a" wife cohabitating with
her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively pre-
sumed to be a child of the marriage." 9 This presumption could be
disproved only if the husband or the wife desired blood tests to be
performed. Furthermore, the test had to be performed within two
years after the child's birth, and in the case of the wife, only after
the supposed biological father had filed an affidavit with the court
alleging paternity of the child.2"
The plaintiff, Michael H., brought an action seeking visita-
tion rights to his biological daughter, Victoria, who lived with her
mother and her mother's husband, the defendant Gerald D. 2'
Michael challenged the validity of the California statute. First, he
claimed that his procedural due process rights were violated by
the statute because the statute took away his liberty interest in his
15. Id. (citing former LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1952)).
16. Id. (citing Succession of Robins, 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977)).
17. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 184 (West Supp. 1990).
18. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
19. Id. at 2339 (quoting CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989)).
20. Id. (citing CAL. EVID. CODE 1] 621 (West 1989)).
21. The facts of the case were quite complex. Carole D. and Gerald D. were married
at the time Victoria was born and Gerald was named as the father on the birth certificate.
Id. at 2337. However, Carole had had an affair with Michael H. and a blood test showed a
98.07 percent probability that he was the biological father of Victoria. Id. Over the course
of three years, Carole and Victoria lived with Gerald, Michael and a third man. Michael
established a relationship with Victoria as her father, and once Carole and Victoria re-
turned to live permanently with Gerald, Michael petitioned the court, challenging the va-
lidity of California's filiation statute and was granted limited visiting privileges. Id. At this
point, Gerald intervened in Michael's action and filed an affidavit with the court alleging
paternity under section 621 of the California filiation statute, CAL. EVID. CODE § 621
(West Supp. 1990). Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2337-38. The trial court granted Gerald's
motion for summary judgment, Michael's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute
was denied, and his visiting privileges were removed. Id. at 2338.
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child's life without an opportunity to prove his paternity. Second,
Michael argued that as a matter of substantive due process, the
state did not have a sufficient interest in ending his relationship
with Victoria.22
The Supreme Court struck down Michael's arguments, hold-
ing that he was not entitled to visitation rights, despite a statutory
exception that granted discretion to the court in awarding visita-
tion rights to a "nonparent." First the Court rejected Michael's
procedural due process claim. The Court stated that the policy
furthered by the statute was
actually a substantive rule of law based upon a determination by
the Legislature as a matter of overriding social policy, that given
a certain relationship between the husband and wife, the hus-
band is to be held responsible for the child, and that the integ-
rity of the family unit should not be impugned.23
The Court then noted that while it had struck down certain ir-
rebuttable presumptions as illegitimate in the past, it had not done
so because of the inadequacy of the procedures but because of
problems with "the adequacy of the 'fit' between the classification
and the policy that the classification serves."24 In other words,
Michael's claim was to be addressed as a substantive due process
issue and not as a procedural due process issue.
The Court continued that in order to be granted protection
by the Constitution, Michael needed to establish that a fundamen-
tal liberty interest traditionally protected by society was at
stake.25 Only then could the Court interfere with a state's legisla-
tion.26 The Court then examined whether Michael's relationship
with Victoria fit within this framework. Justice Scalia found no
traditional protection for this type of relationship in his historical
analysis.2 7 Specifically, the Court refused to classify Michael's re-
lationship to his daughter as a "family", which was an historically
protected interest.28
When faced with Michael's argument that biological fathers
22. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2341.
23. Id. at 2340 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1005, 236
Cal. Rptr. 810, 816 (1987) (quoting Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 623, 179
Cal. Rptr. 9, 10 (1981))).
24. Id. at 2340-41.
25. Id. at 2341.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2341-44.
28. Id. at 2342.
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had been allowed to rebut the marital presumption in other states,
the Court stated that Michael must demonstrate that society had
traditionally given biological fathers parental rights, and not
merely that they had been allowed to rebut the marital presump-
tion.2 9 The Court found that not a single state or decision had
awarded such rights to an adulterous biological father."0 The
Court concluded that whether the marital presumption could be
rebutted was a legislative decision and not a constitutional issue.
Finally, the Court concluded that:
[T]o provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to
deny protection to a marital father, and vice versa. If Michael
has a 'freedom not to conform'. . . Gerald must equivalently
have a 'freedom to conform.' One of them will pay a price for
asserting that 'freedom' - Michael by being unable to act as
father of the child he has adulterously begotten, or Gerald by
being unable to preserve the integrity of the traditional family
unit he and Victoria have established.31
Noting that it was not within the Court's duties to make such a
decision, the Court ruled against Michael.32
II. SMITH V. COLE
The Smith case presented the Louisiana Supreme Court with
two issues: the viability of dual paternity in Louisiana, and
Playville's claim that because the child had a legitimate father, by
virtue of article 184, her mother, Ledora, had no right to bastard-
ize the child for child support.3 3 Judge Cole, writing the court's
opinion, first took an historical approach to the problem. He
pointed out that the original purpose behind Louisiana's treatment
29. Id. at 2343-44.
30. Id. at 2344.
31. Id. at 2345.
32. Victoria, who was represented by a guardian ad litem, also brought a claim ar-
guing a violation of her due process rights since the statute prevented her from maintaining
filial relations with both Michael and Gerald. The Court struck down Victoria's claim stat-
ing that she had an even weaker substantive claim than Michael. Never before in the
history or tradition of society had the concept of multiple fatherhood been recognized. Id.
at 2346.
Victoria also claimed that her equal protection rights had been violated because she
was prevented from rebutting the presumption of legitimacy. The Court applied rational
basis review to this claim and held the statute's legitimate goal of protecting the family was
served by -rational means, and therefore only the husband or the wife could challenge the
legitimacy of the child. Id.
33. Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 849 (La. 1989).
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of illegitimate children was the "promotion and protection of the
family" and "[w]ith the social and legal stigmas which attached
to illegitimacy, it is not surprising that the courts rigorously ap-
plied the presumption of LSA-C.C. art. 184." ' l
However, Judge Cole noted that "[w]hile [article 184] pro-
moted the policy against bastardizing children, it often failed to
conform with reality. '3 5 For instance, men who were sterile or had
not lived with their wives for years, were still presumed to be the
children's fathers." As a result, the legislature enacted Act 430 of
1976, which made article 184's irrebuttable presumption rebutta-
ble. However, this alteration allowed only the husband or his heir
to disavow paternity. 7
Judge Cole then outlined other attacks on article 184's pre-
sumption. These were indirect attacks from children, from biologi-
cal fathers and from the state. In Warren v. Richard,38 the court
allowed a child to recover for the wrongful death of her biological
father in spite of article 184 and the existence of a legally recog-
nized father.3 9 Warren and the decisions that followed allowed the
state to successfully bring support and paternity actions against
biological fathers.40 Finally, biological fathers who were able to
establish an actual relationship with their child received protection
of their due process and substantive rights under the United
States Constitution.4' Relying on these cases, Louisiana courts es-
tablished the rule that the failure of the presumptive father to dis-
avow his paternity did "not conclusively operate to deny a biologi-
cal father his right to avow paternity. ' 42 Therefore, despite the
article 184 presumption, biological fathers were allowed to bring
34. Id.
35. Id. at 850.
36. Id. (citing Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 La. 933, 261 So. 2d 619 (1972)).
37. id.
38. 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974).
39. Id. at 817.
40. Smith, 553 So. 2d at 851 (citing Poche v. Poche, 368 So. 2d 175 (La. Ct. App.),
writ. den., 370 So. 2d 577 (La. 1979).
41. Id. at 851 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)). In Stanley, the Su-
preme Court held that an Illinois statute that automatically made children of unwed fa-
thers wards of the State upon the death of their mothers was unconstitutional and a viola-
tion of the father's equal protection rights. Stanley 405 U.S. at 648-49. The Court
remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Illinois for a hearing to determine the fitness
of the petitioner (an unwed father whose children became wards of the state upon their
mother's death) as a parent before the children automatically became wards of the state.
Id. at 658-59.
42. Id. at 851 (citing Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So. 2d 287 (La. Ct. App. 1985)).
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avowal actions.4"
Next, Judge Cole explained the effect these changes had on
the attitude of the legislature. Although true parentage and dual
paternity were consistent with the 1980 filiation provisions,44 the
legislature amended these provisions in 1981.," The 1981 amend-
ments stated: "In order to establish filiation, a child who does not
enjoy legitimate filiation or who has not been filiated by the initia-
tive of the parent by legitimation or by acknowledgment under
Article 203 must institute a proceeding under Article 209."1 "A
child not entitled to legitimate filation [sic] nor filiated by the ini-
tiative of the parent by legitimation or by acknowledgment under
Article 203 must prove filiation by a preponderance of the evi-
dence in a civil proceeding instituted by the child or on his behalf
within the time limit provided in this Article."4 These amend-
ments created confusion and caused some to believe that the right
of a child to establish true parentage, which had been granted by
the Warren case, had been extinguished by the 1981
amendments.4
In order to discern the true meaning of the 1981 amendments
Judge Cole carefully examined the purpose behind them. The leg-
islature replaced the 1980 language of "any child may establish
filiation, regardless of the circumstances of conception"' 9 with
new language that "[a] child not entitled to legitimate filiation
.. . must prove filiation."50 One commentator argued that this
replacement meant that a child who was presumed to be that of
43. Id. at 851.
44. Id. at 851-52. The 1980 articles stated: "Illegitimate children, who have not been
acknowledged as provided in Article 203, may be allowed to prove their filiation." LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 208 (West Supp. 1990) (amended 1981).
An illegitimate child may be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of filiation
under the provisions of this article. Or any child may establish filiation, regard-
less of the circumstances of conception, by a civil proceeding instituted by the
child or on his behalf in the parish of his birth, or other [proper] venue as pro-
vided by law, within the time limitation prescribed in this Article.
Id. art. 209 (amended 1981, 1982 & 1984).
45. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 208-09 (West Supp. 1990); see Smith, 553 So. 2d 847,
852.
46. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 208 (West Supp. 1990).
47. Id. art. 209 (amended 1982 & 1984).
48. Smith, 553 So. 2d at 852 (citing Spaht, Person, Developments in the Law 1980-
81, 42 LA. L. REV. 403 (1982)).
49. Id. at 853 (quoting La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 209 (West Supp. 1990) (amended
1981, 1982 & 1984).
50. Id. at 853 (citing La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 209 (West Supp. 1990) (amended
1982 & 1984)).
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the mother's husband, under article 184, could not institute filia-
tion actions against another man." However, Judge Cole sug-
gested that this is not the intended meaning. Instead the phrase,
"'a child not entitled to legitimate filiation' means a child who is
not entitled to legitimate filiation to the parent to whom he is
attempting to prove filiation.' ' 52 Therefore the article distin-
guished between children attempting to prove filiation against a
parent presumed to be a legitimate parent and children attempt-
ing to prove filiation against a parent not presumed to be a parent.
Judge Cole found that rather than barring suits of children in
Donel's situation, the amended article served to determine the
method for the child to prove filiation.5 3 This was supported by
the legislative history of the act, in which the Council of the Loui-
siana State Law Institute had previously discussed the adoption of
article 209's presumption in order to aid the Department of
Health and Human Resources in its child support collection ef-
forts.54 Thus, Judge Cole concluded that the amendment merely
served to codify the existing case law which allowed the state to
bring actions against biological fathers despite the article 184
presumption.
Having determined that dual paternity was consistent with
the statutory language in Louisiana's filiation provisions, Judge
Cole then considered effects of dual paternity. First he stated that
recognition of a biological father would in no way affect the origi-
nal classification of legitimacy. "The legal tie of paternity will not
be affected by subsequent proof of the child's actual biological
tie."55 Thus, although Playville might be Donel's biological father,
Henry Smith was still her legal father.
The original purpose of the article 184 presumption was not
to shield biological fathers from their child support obligations. 6
Nor did the fact that the legal father accepted responsibility for
the child work as a benefit to the biological father. A biological
father was civilly and criminally liable to support his offspring,
whether or not someone else shared that responsibility.57
51. Id. at 853 (citing Spaht, supra note 48, at 405-06).
52. Id. at 853 (quoting LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art 209 (West Supp. 1990) (amended
1982 & 1984) and citing Griffin v. Succession of Branch, 479 So. 2d 324, 327 (La. 1985)).
53. Id. at 853.
54. Id. at 853-54.
55. Id. at 854.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Finally, Judge Cole recognized that this decision was in the
best interest of the child. 58 Because the statute allowed Donel or
her mother to bring a filiation proceeding, a biological tie was rec-
ognized and Playville was liable for child support.
In sum, Louisiana retained the presumption of article 184
that the husband of the mother was the father, while also recog-
nizing the concept of dual paternity. If the presumptive father did
not timely disavow his paternity, he became the legal father. Filia-
tion actions proved paternity and did not affect the status of the
legal father. As a result, the mother and the biological father
shared the support obligations once paternity was proven. Judge
Cole noted that the separate question of whether the legal father
must also share the support obligation had not been decided. 59
III. ANALYSIS
The Smith case demonstrated the flexibility of the legal sys-
tem. Rather than rely on outdated precedent, Judge Cole took a
contemporary concept and applied it to the existing situation. By
recognizing the views of modern society and considering the best
interests of the child, Judge Cole wrote an opinion that was opti-
mal for all parties involved.
Judge Cole acknowledged that at one time there was a social
stigma attached to illegitimate children. 0 However, he noted that
given the change in the types of relationships of modern society,
such stigma no longer prevailed. Furthermore, Judge Cole recog-
nized that the old laws did not make sense in some instances, for
example, failing to consider that a sterile husband could not possi-
bly be the father of the child. Thus, by studying the history and
purposes of the laws and taking a realistic attitude towards statu-
tory interpretation, Judge Cole determined that dual paternity-ex-
isted in Louisiana.
The analysis did not end there however. Judge Cole contin-
ued to examine the effect of dual paternity, demonstrating that
conflicting laws often existed simultaneously in the legal system.
In order to avoid confusion, Judge Cole clarified what each of
these conflicting principles meant. The end result was that a child
could have two fathers at the same time, both responsible for her
58. Id.
59. Id. at 855.
60. Id. at 849.
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in different ways. This result made sense because it did not unduly
infringe upon either party. For example, the legal father still had
the opportunity to disavow his paternity and any responsibility
that he was legally obligated to take resulted from his failure to
act timely. Furthermore, the biological father was directed to do
what any other biological father should do in the first place.
Despite having a similar issue to the one in Smith, the Su-
preme Court, in Michael H., failed to take advantage of the legal
system's flexibility. Not only did the Court render an unfair re-
sult, it also failed to take the opportunity to make the law consis-
tent with modern society.
First of all, the Court could have characterized the relation-
ship between a father and his biological daughter as a "family."
The Court focused on the fact that this relationship did not fit
within the traditional mold of a family, and as a result Michael's
substantive due process claim failed. The Court failed to acknowl-
edge that strict use of the term "family" was not required and had
not always been required by the Court." The Court also had the
option of departing from precedent in determining what should be
considered a liberty interest. Instead of admitting that in modern
society this type of relationship was recognized as a family inter-
est, the Court stated that Michael did not fit within the traditional
mold and thereby cast aside any alternative for him.
Second, the Court evidently disregarded decisions that have
granted fathers in Michael's position parental rights. 2 Further-
more, the Court stated that if it were to rule for Michael it would
be taking away the protection already enjoyed by the marital fa-
ther. This was not the case. As shown in Smith, the concept of
dual paternity was not a new one, and both father-child relation-
ships could exist simultaneously.
Notwithstanding these problems, the Court's decision was un-
fair for two reasons. First, by upholding the statute, the Court
failed to consider the wishes of the biological father. Although the
statute potentially allowed the biological father to claim paternity
by filing an affidavit with the court, if for some reason the mother
did not want to disavow paternity, the filiation action would not be
61. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (The Court construed
"family" to include a woman who was living with her two grandsons, who were related to
each other as first cousins. It then struck down the city's statute which defined family in a
manner so as to prevent them from living together.)
62. E.g., Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So. 2d 287 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
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pursued. One could envision situations where the biological fathers
were totally at the mercy of the child's mother, who most likely
would not want to destroy the relationship with her husband by
admitting that she had committed adultery.
Second, not only did the Court ignore the wishes of Michael,
but the wishes of his daughter as well. The Court had the statu-
tory authority to compel visitation rights for Michael, but it re-
fused to do so. The facts indicated a situation that was ripe for
allowing visitation. Not only did Victoria and her mother live with
Michael previously, but Michael had held Victoria out as his own.
Thus, a bond between the two had already been established. Fur-
thermore, both Michael and Victoria petitioned the Court to allow
visitation rights. Thus, it was bitter irony that in attempting to
protect the sanctity of the family the Court succeeded in denying
a child's right to know her biological father.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Louisiana exuded logic and fairness
with its decision in Smith v. Cole. Not only did the court reflect
the view of the legislature in its statutory interpretation, but it
reflected the view of modern society. On the other hand, the Su-
preme Court of the United States exhibited an unrealistic attitude
by upholding the archaic California statute. Along with strictly
construing the concept of family, the Court's reasoning was un-
convincing. Moreover, the Court failed to consider the wishes of
Michael and his daughter. In the end, justice was not served.
PAMELA S. NAGY
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